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Robots are increasingly envisaged as our future cohabitants. However, while
considerable progress has been made in recent years in terms of their technological
realization, the ability of robots to interact with humans in an intuitive and social way
is still quite limited. An important challenge for social robotics is to determine how
to design robots that can perceive the user’s needs, feelings, and intentions, and
adapt to users over a broad range of cognitive abilities. It is conceivable that if robots
were able to adequately demonstrate these skills, humans would eventually accept
them as social companions. We argue that the best way to achieve this is using a
systematic experimental approach based on behavioral and physiological neuroscience
methods such as motion/eye-tracking, electroencephalography, or functional near-
infrared spectroscopy embedded in interactive human–robot paradigms. This approach
requires understanding how humans interact with each other, how they perform tasks
together and how they develop feelings of social connection over time, and using these
insights to formulate design principles that make social robots attuned to the workings
of the human brain. In this review, we put forward the argument that the likelihood of
artificial agents being perceived as social companions can be increased by designing
them in a way that they are perceived as intentional agents that activate areas in the
human brain involved in social-cognitive processing. We first review literature related
to social-cognitive processes and mechanisms involved in human–human interactions,
and highlight the importance of perceiving others as intentional agents to activate these
social brain areas. We then discuss how attribution of intentionality can positively affect
human–robot interaction by (a) fostering feelings of social connection, empathy and
prosociality, and by (b) enhancing performance on joint human–robot tasks. Lastly, we
describe circumstances under which attribution of intentionality to robot agents might
be disadvantageous, and discuss challenges associated with designing social robots
that are inspired by neuroscientific principles.
Keywords: attribution of intentionality, mind perception, social robotics, human–robot interaction, social
neuroscience
INTRODUCTION
Robots are becoming a vision for societies of the near future, partially due to a growing need for
assistance beyond what is currently possible with a human workforce (Ward et al., 2011). Robots
can assist humans in a wide spectrum of domains (Tapus and Matarić, 2006; Cabibihan et al.,
2013) that are not necessarily limited to the three d’s (dirty, dangerous, dull) of robotics, where
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robots are envisaged to assist humans during tasks that are
hazardous, repetitive, or prone to errors (Takayama et al.,
2008). On the contrary, there is a plethora of other domains
where robots can (and perhaps should be) deployed, including
entertainment, teaching, and health care: Pet robots like Paro
(Shibata et al., 2001), or AIBO (developed by Sony1, see also
Fujita and Kitano, 1998) or the huggable pillow-phone robot,
Hugvie (Yamazaki et al., 2016) are used for elderly patients to
reduce loneliness, increase social communicativeness, or improve
cognitive performance (Tapus et al., 2007; Birks et al., 2016),
and have positive effects on mood, emotional expressiveness
and social bonding among dementia patients (Martin et al.,
2013; Birks et al., 2016). In addition to their applicability
for elderly patients (Wada et al., 2005; Wada and Shibata,
2006), social robots (a) are used in therapeutical interventions
for children with autism spectrum disorder to help practice
social skills, such as joint attention, turn-taking or emotion
understanding (Dautenhahn, 2003; Robins et al., 2005; Ricks
and Colton, 2010; Scassellati et al., 2012; Tapus et al., 2012;
Cabibihan et al., 2013; Anzalone et al., 2014; Bekele et al., 2014;
Kajopoulos et al., 2015; Warren et al., 2015), and (b) improve
outcomes for patients with sensorimotor impairments during
rehabilitation (Hogan and Krebs, 2004; Prange et al., 2006;
Basteris et al., 2014). Outside the clinical context, social robots
foster collaboration in the workplace (Hinds et al., 2004), improve
learning (Mubin et al., 2013), and problem solving (Chang et al.,
2010; Castledine and Chalmers, 2011; Kory and Breazeal, 2014),
and deepen students’ understanding of mathematics and science
in the classroom (Fernandes et al., 2006; Church et al., 2010).
They also facilitate activities in daily lives, either as friendly
companions at home (Kidd and Breazeal, 2008; Graf et al., 2009),
or as assistants in supermarkets and airports (Triebel et al.,
2016).
Despite this number of positive examples where robots
support and assist their human counterparts in everyday
life, general attitudes toward robots are not always positive
(Flandorfer, 2012). In fact, the general public can be quite
skeptical with respect to the introduction of robot assistants
in everyday life (Bartneck and Reichenbach, 2005), especially
when aspects like signing over decision-making or control to
the robot are at stake (Scopelliti et al., 2005). Pop culture,
myths and novels in western cultures also often depict robots
or artificial agents as a threat to humanity (Kaplan, 2004).
As a result, users might be worried about violations of their
privacy or about becoming dependent on robot technology
(Cortellessa et al., 2008), and particularly elderly individuals
might be concerned about integrating robots into their home
environment (Scopelliti et al., 2005). Concerns have also been
raised regarding the potential of robots to contribute to social
isolation and deprivation of human contact (Sharkey, 2008), and
assistive robots are at risk of becoming stigmatized by the media
as tools for lonely, old and dependent users. In line with this
assumption, elderly individuals are reluctant to accept robots as
social companions for themselves, although they acknowledge
their potential benefits for other user groups (Neven, 2010).
1https://www.sony.net/SonyInfo/News/Press_Archive/199806/98-052/
Overall, these studies reveal that humans can be willing to
accept social robots in some contexts but might be reluctant to do
so in others. In consequence, research in social robotics needs to
determine not only how to design robots that optimally support
stakeholders with different cognitive and technical abilities, but
also which features robots need to have to in order to be accepted
as social companions that understand our needs, feelings and
intentions, and can share valuable experiences with humans. One
problem with the current state of social robotics research is that it
often lacks systematicity, and in effect, specifications of particular
features that facilitate treating robots as social companions are
not sufficiently addressed. We suggest addressing this issue by
using behavioral and physiological neuroscience methods (i.e.,
eye-tracking, EEG, fNIRS, fMRI) in robotics research with the
goal of objectively measuring how humans react to robot agents,
how they perform tasks with robots and how they develop mutual
understanding and social engagement over time. In this context,
we note that each method has advantages and disadvantages, and
is suitable for specific questions but not others (for examples,
see Table 1 and Figure 1). Insights gained from applying these
methods can then be used to formulate design principles for
social robots that are attuned to the workings of the human
brain. In particular, we argue that if robots are to be treated
as social companions, they should evoke mechanisms of social
cognition in the brain that are typically activated when humans
interact with other humans, such as joint attention (Moore
and Dunham, 1995; Baron-Cohen, 1997), spatial perspective-
taking (Tversky and Hard, 2009; Zwickel, 2009; Samson et al.,
2010), action understanding (Gallese et al., 1996; Rizzolatti and
Craighero, 2004; Brass et al., 2007), turn-taking (Knapp et al.,
2013), and mentalizing (Baron-Cohen, 1997; Frith and Frith,
2006a).
But how can we make robots and other automated agents
appear social? Research suggests that the two most important
aspects for artificial agents to appear social are human-like
appearance and behavior (Tapus and Matarić, 2006; Waytz
et al., 2010b; Wykowska et al., 2016), with behavior probably
being even more critical than appearance (a speculation that
needs to be tested empirically). The effectiveness of behavior
in inducing perceptions of humanness can be seen in Sci-Fi
movies, where agents with not very human-like appearance like
C-3PO, Wall-E, or Baymax can be perceived as social entities
that evoke sympathy or affinity because their behavior is so
human-like. On the other hand, human-looking agents like Data
(‘Star Trek’) or Terminator (‘Terminator’) can evoke a sense of
oddness or discomfort when they show mechanistic behavior.
We suggest that research should build upon these observations
and investigate (a) which physical and behavioral agent features
are associated with humanness and are therefore able to
make artificial entities appear social, and (b) how perceiving
artificial agents as social entities affects attitudes, acceptance and
performance in human–robot interaction. In order to accomplish
that, it is useful to first understand the neural and cognitive
underpinnings of social cognition in human–human interaction
and then examine whether similar mechanisms can be activated
in human–robot interaction. The ultimate goal is to create robots
that are human-like enough to evoke mechanisms of social
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TABLE 1 | Advantages and disadvantages of measures used to investigate human–robot interaction, together with example questions that can be best addressed with
the respective measure; ERP, event related potential; PSP, postsynaptic potential; fMRI, functional magnetic resonance imaging; fNIRS, functional near infrared
spectroscopy; TDS, transcranial doppler sonography; BF, blood flow.























































































































cognition in human interaction partners, and to achieve this with
the use of neuroscientific and psychological methods.
This review focuses on humanoid robots (as opposed to robots
with other non-humanoid shapes) for the following reasons:
first, the goal of this review is to understand social interactions
between humans and robots that live in shared environments.
These environments are typically designed to match human
movement and cognitive capabilities (in terms of physical space,
ergonomics, or interfaces). Robots that are supposed to act as
social interaction partners in the future need to fit in these
human-attuned environments by emulating human form and
cognition. For example, a legged service robot at a restaurant
would be able to step over obstacles with which a wheeled
robot might have troubles. Similarly, a robot of human-like
width and height would be able to move around in human
environments better than a larger robot. Human shape also
allows the robot to communicate internal states like emotions
(i.e., via facial expression or body posture) or intentions (i.e.,
via social cues like gestures or changes in gaze direction) in a
natural way. Second, robots with a humanoid appearance have
the potential to provide a number of desired functions within
a single platform (i.e., service, learning, companionship), which
allows for a more general and flexible use than more specialized
platforms without human features. For example, in a home
environment, a humanoid robot can manipulate kitchen utensils
and appliances to cook (oven, fridge, dishwasher, etc.). The same
robot can press buttons and control light settings, switch the
television on and off, serve food, and utilize all tools that are
already available at home, simplifying the humanoid robots’
deployment and increasing their usefulness, without substantially
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FIGURE 1 | Investigation of human-robot interaction with the use of neuroscientific methods. The image on the left illustrates the setup of an fMRI experiment
measuring changes in blood flow in social brain areas during a joint attention task with the robot EDDIE (designed by Technical University of Munich). Participants are
asked to respond as fast and accurately as possible to the identity of a target letter (“F” vs. “T”) that is either looked at nor not looked at by EDDIE. Changes in
activation in social brain areas can be captured with a high spatial resolution, but no natural interactivity with the robot can be achieved (i.e., interaction needs to be
imagined: offline social cognition). The image on the right shows a setup where neural processes associated with joint attention are examined using EEG and
eye-tracking during interactions with the robot iCub (designed at the Istituto Italiano di Technologia by Metta et al., 2008). Similar to the previous example,
participants are asked to react to the identity of a target letter (“T” vs. “V”) that is either looked at or not looked at by iCub. Mechanisms of joint attention can be
captured with high temporal resolution during relatively natural interactions (i.e., online social cognition). Written informed consent has been obtained for publication
of the identifiable image on the right.
modifying the human environment. Lastly, the goal of this review
is to advocate for the integration of behavioral and physiological
neuroscience methods in the design and evaluation of social
robots able to engage in social interactions, which requires robot
platforms that are human-like enough to activate mechanisms
in the human brain in a fashion similar to human interaction
partners. Since many social-cognitive brain mechanisms are
sensitive to human appearance and behavior (see “Observing
Intentional Agents Activates Social Brain Areas”), humanoid
robot designs are the most promising, but not necessarily the only
avenue to accomplish this goal (for research on animal-like and
fictional robot designs, see for instance, Shibata et al., 2001 or
Kozima and Nakagawa, 2007). However, we acknowledge that for
more specific and focused applications, other robot designs can
be more suitable (Fujita and Kitano, 1998; Johnson and Demiris,
2005).
In this review, we argue that one of the main factors
that contributes to robots being treated as social entities is
their ability to be perceived as intentional2 beings with a
mind (see “Can Robots be Perceived as Intentional Agents?”),
so that they activate brain areas involved in social-cognitive
processes in a similar way as human interaction partners do (see
2Note that we use the term ‘intentionality’ in the philosophical sense:
“Intentionality is the power of minds to be about, to represent, or to stand for,
things, properties and states of affairs” (Jacob, 2014). In other words, intentionality
characterizes mental states to refer to something. For example, a belief (mental
state) is about something, refers to something. This way of defining intentionality
might be different from the common use of the term “intentional” (commonly
“intentional” might be understood as “done on purpose” or “deliberate”). The
philosophical meaning dates back to Brentano: “Every mental phenomenon is
characterized by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional
(or mental) inexistence of an object, and what we might call, though not wholly
unambiguously, reference to a content, direction toward an object (which is not
to be understood here as meaning a thing), or immanent objectivity” (Brentano,
1874, p. 68). We use the term ‘intentional’ in the philosophical sense in order to
highlight the aspect of robots being potentially perceived as agents with mental
states (as opposed to only mindless machines).
“Observing Intentional Agents Activates Social Brain Areas”).
Since intentionality is a feature that can be ascribed to non-
human agents or withdrawn from human agents (Gray et al.,
2007), it is important to understand the principles underlying the
attribution of intentionality to others, and to examine its effects
on attitudes, acceptance and performance in human–human and
human–robot interaction (see “Effects of Mind Perception on
Attitudes and Performance in HRI”). The ultimate goal is to
design social robots that trigger attributions of intentionality with
a high likelihood and activate social-cognitive areas in the human
brain (see “Designing Robots as Intentional Agents,” for examples
of robot designs that are in line with neuroscientific models of the
social brain).
CAN ROBOTS BE PERCEIVED AS
INTENTIONAL AGENTS?
In human–human interactions, we activate brain areas
responsible for social-cognitive processing and make inferences
about what others think, feel and intend based on observing
their behavior (Frith and Frith, 2006a,b). However, before we
usually make inferences about intentions or emotions, we need
to perceive others as intentional beings, with the general ability
of having internal states (i.e., mind perception; Gray et al., 2007).
Attributing internal states in social interactions is the default
mode for human agents, but this might not automatically happen
during interactions with artificial agents like Siri, Waymo, or
Jibo3 due to their ambiguous mind status. As a result, human
brain areas specialized in processing inputs of intentional agents
might not be sufficiently activated when interacting with robot
agents, which can potentially have negative consequences on
3Webpages for Siri (https://www.apple.com/ios/siri/), Waymo (https://waymo.
com/), Jibo (https://www.jibo.com/).
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attitudes and performance in human–robot interactions. We
suggest that this issue should be addressed in social robotics by
incorporating neuroscientific methods in the engineering design
cycle, with the goal of designing robots that activate social brain
areas in a similar manner as human interaction partners do.
Robots that are attuned to the human cognitive system have
the potential to make human–robot interaction more intuitive,
and can positively affect acceptance and performance within
human–robot teams.
Luckily for human–robot interaction, perceiving mind is not
exclusive to agents that actually have a mind, but can also
be triggered by agents who are not believed to have a mind
(i.e., robots, avatars, self-driving cars) or agents with ambiguous
mind status (i.e., animals; Gray et al., 2007). Mind is in the
eye of the beholder, which means that it can be ascribed to
others or denied, based on cognitive or motivational features
associated with the perceiver, as well as physical and behavioral
features of the perceived agent (Waytz et al., 2010b). For instance,
being in need of social connection or lacking system-specific
knowledge has been shown to increase the likelihood that human
characteristics like ‘having a mind’ are ascribed to non-human
agents (i.e., anthropomorphism; Rosset, 2008; Hackel et al., 2014),
while feeling socially rejected or witnessing harmful acts being
done to others by human beings decreases the extent to which
mind is perceived in them (i.e., dehumanization; Epley et al.,
2007; Bastian and Haslam, 2010; Waytz et al., 2010a). The human
tendency to anthropomorphize others is so strong that some
of us readily perceive craters on the moon as the ‘man in the
moon,’ burnt areas on a toast as ‘Jesus,’ or the front of a car as
‘having a face,’ and are not surprised when Tom Hanks becomes
friends with the volleyball Wilson (‘Cast Away’), or when Joaquin
Phoenix falls in love with his virtual agent Samantha (‘Her’).
In line with these observations, psychological research
has shown that anthropomorphism, and specifically mind
perception, are highly automatic processes that activate social
areas in the human brain in a bottom–up fashion (Gao et al.,
2010; Looser and Wheatley, 2010; Wheatley et al., 2011; Schein
and Gray, 2015), triggered by human-like facial features (Maurer
et al., 2002; Looser and Wheatley, 2010; Balas and Tonsager,
2014; Schein and Gray, 2015; Deska et al., 2016), or biological
motion (Castelli et al., 2000). Due to the automatic nature of mind
perception, intentional agents can be differentiated from non-
intentional agents within a few 100 ms (Wheatley et al., 2011;
Looser et al., 2013), and even just passively viewing stimuli that
trigger mind perception is sufficient to induce activation in a wide
range of brain regions implicated in social cognition (Wagner
et al., 2011).
Using the anthropomorphic model when making inferences
about the behavior of non-human entities makes sense given
that we are experts in what it means to be human, but have no
phenomenological knowledge about what it means to be non-
human (Nagel, 1974; Gould, 1998). Thus, when we interact with
entities for which we lack specific knowledge, we commonly
choose the ‘human’ model to predict their behavior, such as
blaming God for events that we cannot explain or thinking
that computers want to sabotage us when they simply start to
malfunction (Rosset, 2008). Once the human model is activated,
we can use it to infer particular intentions behind observed
actions (i.e., mentalizing) or to reason about emotional states
underlying facial expressions or changes in body language (i.e.,
empathizing). We do this by imagining what we would intend or
feel if we were in a comparable situation (Buccino et al., 2001;
Umilta et al., 2001; Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004), which gives
us immediate phenomenological access to the internal states of
others. Despite the advantage of being able to reason about their
internal states, automatically activating the anthropomorphic
model when interacting with robots could also have negative
consequences when it leads to incorrect predictions because the
behavioral repertoire of the robot does not perfectly overlap
with human behavior (Bisio et al., 2014), or when it potentially
induces a cognitive conflict because certain robot features
trigger mind perception (i.e., appearance), while others hinder
mind perception (i.e., motion; Chaminade et al., 2007; Saygin
et al., 2012; see “Negative Effects of Mind Perception in Social
Interactions”). For a detailed discussion of costs and benefits
associated with anthropomorphism in human–robot interaction,
please also see (Złotowski et al., 2015).
In sum, these studies suggest that non-human agents have
the potential to trigger mind perception, as long as they
display observable signs of intentionality, such as human-like
appearance and/or behavior. In this review, we argue that
mind perception has the potential to positively affect human–
robot interaction by (a) activating the social brain network
involved in action understanding and mentalizing, (b) enhancing
feelings of social connection, empathy and prosociality, and
(c) fostering performance during joint action tasks. However,
we also discuss circumstances in which mind perception might
be disadvantageous for human–robot interaction, and suggest
robot design features that allow humans to flexibly activate and
deactivate the ‘human’ model when interacting with robot agents.
OBSERVING INTENTIONAL AGENTS
ACTIVATES SOCIAL BRAIN AREAS
In order to successfully interact with others, we need to
understand and predict their behavior (see “Performing Actions
Together: Action Understanding and Joint Action”), and be
able to make inferences about their intentions and emotions
(see “Making Inferences about Internal States: Mentalizing
and Empathizing”). The human brain is highly specialized in
understanding the behaviors and internal states of others, and
contains areas that are specifically activated when we interact
with other social entities (i.e., social brain; Adolphs, 2009).
Understanding actions is subserved by frontoparietal networks
of the action-perception system (APS), while reasoning about
internal states activates the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), as
well as prefrontal areas like the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC),
and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC; Brothers, 2002; Saxe and
Kanwisher, 2003; Amodio and Frith, 2006; Adolphs, 2009; van
Overwalle, 2009; Saygin et al., 2012; see Figure 2). Activation
within the social brain network is predictive of how much we
like others, how strongly we empathize with them, and how well
we understand their actions (Ames et al., 2008; Cikara et al.,
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FIGURE 2 | Social brain network consisting of the action perception system (APS, mainly brodmann areas 6, 44, but also 4 and 40), superior temporal sulcus (STS;
brodmann areas 21, 22), temporo-parietal junction (TPJ; brodmann areas 39,40), medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC; brodmann areas 8, 9, 10, 32) and anterior
cingulate cortex (ACC; brodmann area 24). APS and STS detect biological motion and make inferences about low-level action goals from observed behavior. TPJ
and mPFC are involved in mentalizing about high-level action goals and stable person features. ACC is associated with the attribution of mental states to non-human
entities. The image has been modified (the original image was retrieved from: http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-SE4Yb_SRjdw/T6rNRgvRedI/AAAAAAAAAA0/FaU50Z
emOCY/s1600/brodmann.png).
2011; Gutsell and Inzlicht, 2012), and can therefore be used
as a proxy to estimate the degree of socialness that is ascribed
to others. Although non-human agents can generally activate
the social brain network, the strength of activation depends on
the degree to which they are perceived as human-like entities
with a mind (Blakemore and Decety, 2001; Gallese et al., 2004;
Chaminade et al., 2007). The following sections describe the
social brain network in more detail and discuss whether social
robots can activate these brain areas, and if so, under which
conditions.
Performing Actions Together: Action
Understanding and Joint Action
One key mechanism in social interactions is the ability to
understand the actions of others, that is: being able to tell what
sort of action is executed, and based on what kind of intention.
Action understanding in the primate brain is based on shared
representations that are activated both when an action is executed
and when a similar action is observed in others (i.e., resonance;
Gallese et al., 1996; Decety and Grèzes, 1999). Observing the
actions of others facilitates the execution of a similar action
(i.e., motor imitation), and hinders the execution of a different
action (i.e., motor interference), since both action observation
and execution activate the same neural network (Kilner et al.,
2003; Oztop et al., 2005; Press et al., 2005). Imitation/interference
effects are observed, for instance, when participants perform
continuous unidirectional arm movements while observing
continuous arm movements in the same/orthogonal direction or
when being asked to perform an opening/closing gesture with
their hand while observing opening/closing gestures in others
(Kilner et al., 2003; Oztop et al., 2005; Press et al., 2005). Shared
representations are also essential for performing joint actions,
where two or more individuals coordinate their actions in time
and space to achieve a shared action goal (Sebanz et al., 2005;
Sebanz and Knoblich, 2009). For instance, when performing an
action coordination task with another person (e.g., to cause a
moving circle to overlap with a moving dot), we need to represent
our own action (e.g., accelerating the circle) together with the
action the other person is performing (e.g., slowing down the
moving circle) in order to accomplish a shared action goal (e.g.,
establish overlap between the circle and the dot; Knoblich and
Jordan, 2003). Performing a task together with another person
also impacts action planning (Sebanz et al., 2006), and action
monitoring (van Schie et al., 2004), which provides further
support for the involvement of shared representations in the
execution of joint actions.
In the primate brain, action understanding and execution
activate the APS, including temporal areas like the posterior
superior temporal sulcus (pSTS), involved in processing
biological motion, as well as frontoparietal areas like the inferior
parietal cortex and ventral premotor cortex (IPC and vPMC),
responsible for inferring the intentions underlying observed
actions (Saygin et al., 2004; Becchio et al., 2006; Pobric and
Hamilton, 2006; Grafton and Hamilton, 2007; Saygin, 2007). In
non-human primates, the IPC and vPMC are known to contain
mirror neurons that fire both during action observation and
execution, and infer intentions by simulating the action outcome
as if the observer was executing the actions himself (Gallese et al.,
1996, 2004; Keysers and Perrett, 2004; Rizzolatti and Craighero,
2004; Iacoboni, 2005). Although there is agreement that action
understanding in humans is also based on the principles of
resonance (Umilta et al., 2001; Kilner et al., 2003; Oztop et al.,
2005; Press et al., 2005), the particular role of mirror neurons in
this process still needs to be determined (Dinstein et al., 2007;
Chong et al., 2008; Kilner et al., 2009; Mukamel et al., 2010;
Saygin et al., 2012).
Given the importance of action understanding in human–
robot interaction, it is essential to examine whether activation
within the APS is exclusive to human agents or whether robotic
agents can also activate this network. Robots were initially not
assumed to activate the APS due to the fact that activation in
this network is sensitive to the observation of biological motion
and intentional behavior. In line with this assumption, initial
studies on action understanding in human–robot interaction
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were not able to show motor resonance for the observation of
robot actions (Kilner et al., 2003) or at least to a significantly
smaller degree than for the observation of human agents (Oztop
et al., 2005; Press et al., 2005; Oberman et al., 2007). Follow-up
studies consistently showed that motor resonance can be induced
by robot agents, but that its degree seems to depend on features
like physical appearance (Chaminade et al., 2007; Kupferberg
et al., 2012), motion kinematics (Bisio et al., 2014), or visibility
of the full body (Chaminade and Cheng, 2009). In contrast,
beliefs regarding the humanness of the observed agent did not
have an impact on the presence or absence of motor resonance
(Press et al., 2006). Yet another set of studies showed that
motor resonance during interactions with robot agents can even
reach levels comparable to human agents, however, only when
participants were explicitly instructed to pay attention to their
actions (Gazzola et al., 2007; Cross et al., 2011; Wykowska et al.,
2014a), or when given additional time to familiarize themselves
with the robots’ actions (Press et al., 2007). These findings
suggest that participants naturally pay more attention to human
actions than robot actions, with the consequence that brain areas
involved in action understanding and prediction might be under-
activated during interactions with robots. However, this effect can
be reverted if participants are encouraged to process robot actions
at a sufficient level of detail, either via instruction or via increased
familiarization time.
Altogether, these studies suggest that robots have the potential
to activate the human APS, at the very least in a reduced fashion,
but under certain conditions even to a similar degree as human
interaction partners. The degree of activation in APS depends on
physical factors, such as the appearance or kinematic profile of a
robot agent, as well as cognitive factors, such as one’s willingness
to reason about a robot’s intentionality or the level of expertise
one has with a particular robotic system. This means that low-
level mechanisms of social cognition are not specifically sensitive
to the identity of an interaction partner, and can be activated by
robot agents as long as their actions map onto the human motor
repertoire, and people are motivated to pay attention to them.
Making Inferences about Internal States:
Mentalizing and Empathizing
When navigating social environments, we need to understand
how others feel (i.e., empathizing; Baron-Cohen, 2005; Singer,
2006), and what they intend to do (i.e., mentalizing: Frith and
Frith, 2003, 2006a). Similar to joint action, empathizing and
mentalizing are based on shared representations that allow us
to infer the emotions and intentions of others by simulating
what we would feel or intend in a comparable situation (i.e.,
represent the behavior of others in our own reference frame; de
Guzman et al., 2016; Steinbeis, 2016). In terms of empathizing,
seeing or imagining the emotional states of others automatically
activates similar states in the observer, thereby creating a shared
representation at the neural and physiological level (Preston and
de Waal, 2002). For instance, receiving a painful stimulus and
observing the stimulus being presented to others activates similar
brain areas, involving the anterior insula, rostral ACC, brain
stem, and cerebellum (Singer et al., 2004). Similarly, smelling
disgusting odors and seeing faces disgusted by the presentation
of the same odors activates shared representations in the anterior
insula (Wicker et al., 2003), and being touched and observing
someone else being touched at the same parts of the body
activates similar areas within the secondary somatosensory cortex
(SII; Keysers et al., 2004).
When studying mentalizing, researchers typically present
participants with stories that involve false-belief manipulations
(Wimmer and Perner, 1983; Baron-Cohen et al., 1985) and
require them to (a) take the perspective of others in order to
understand whether and how their representation of the situation
differs from their own (Epley et al., 2004; Epley and Caruso,
2009), (b) make inferences about what others are interested
in based on non-verbal cues like gaze direction (Friesen and
Kingstone, 1998), and (c) reason about how others currently
feel based on facial expressions or body postures (Baron-Cohen,
2005; Singer, 2006). In the human brain, processes related to
mentalizing are subserved by a distributed network consisting
of temporal areas like the TPJ, as well as prefrontal areas like
the mPFC and ACC (Ruby and Decety, 2001; Chaminade and
Decety, 2002; Farrer et al., 2003; Grèzes et al., 2004, 2006; van
Overwalle, 2009). Bilateral TPJ is involved in inferring intentions
based on sensory input (Gallagher et al., 2000; Ruby and Decety,
2001; Chaminade and Decety, 2002; Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003;
Grèzes et al., 2004, 2006; Ohnishi et al., 2004; Perner et al.,
2006; Saxe and Powell, 2006), and allows differentiating self from
other intentions via perspective-taking (Ruby and Decety, 2001;
Chaminade and Decety, 2002; Farrer et al., 2003; van Overwalle,
2009). Although both sides of the TPJ have basic mentalizing and
perspective-taking abilities, expertise regarding these functions
seems to be lateralized, with the left side being more specialized
on perspective-taking (Samson et al., 2004), and the right side
being more involved in mentalizing (Gallagher et al., 2002; Frith
and Frith, 2003; Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003; Saxe and Wexler,
2005; Costa et al., 2008). Activation within left TPJ is also
associated with attributions of humanness (Chaminade et al.,
2007; Zink et al., 2011) and intentionality (Perner et al., 2006)
to non-human agents, and gray matter volume in left TPJ has
been shown to be a reliable predictor for individual differences
in anthropomorphizing non-human agents (Cullen et al., 2014).
Right TPJ is specialized on inferring intentions underlying
observed human behavior, and shows stronger activation for
intentional than non-intentional or random actions (Gallagher
et al., 2002; Cavanna and Trimble, 2006; Krach et al., 2008;
Chaminade et al., 2012). In addition to its involvement in
mentalizing, the TPJ also serves as a convergence point for
processing social and non-social information (Mitchell, 2008;
Scholz et al., 2009; Chang et al., 2013; Krall et al., 2015, 2016).
When we make inferences about the internal states of others, it
is essential to incorporate knowledge about their dispositions and
preferences into the mentalizing process, in particular in long-
term interactions (van Overwalle, 2009). This requires the ability
to represent behaviors over a long period of time, across different
circumstances and with different social partners, and is associated
with activation in the mPFC (Frith and Frith, 2001; Decety and
Chaminade, 2003; Gallagher and Frith, 2003; Amodio and Frith,
2006). Neurons in the mPFC have the ability to discharge over
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extended periods of time and across different events (Wood
and Grafman, 2003; Huey et al., 2006), and their activation is
positively correlated to the degree of background knowledge
we have about another person (Saxe and Wexler, 2005). The
ventral mPFC is associated with reasoning about the emotional
states of others (Hynes et al., 2006; Vollm et al., 2006), while
the dorsal mPFC is more recruited during triadic interactions
involving two agents and one object of interest (Brass et al.,
2005; Jackson et al., 2006; Mitchell et al., 2006). Due to a high
degree of interconnectivity with other brain areas, the mPFC can
process a wealth of neural input and is capable of implementing
abstract inferences regarding interpersonal information (Leslie
et al., 2004; Amodio and Frith, 2006). Similar to the TPJ, the
mPFC is more strongly activated by agents who are believed to
have a mind (Krach et al., 2008; Riedl et al., 2014).
Perceiving others as intentional entities is particularly
associated with activation in the ACC, a cortical midline structure
extending from the genu to the corpus callosum (Barch et al.,
2001). The anterior ACC is activated when we attribute internal
states to others, and responds more strongly during interactions
with intentional agents versus non-intentional agents (Gallagher
et al., 2002), as well as during interactions that require real-time
mentalizing rather than retrospective inferences about mental
states based on stories or images (Gallagher et al., 2000; McCabe
et al., 2001). In addition, the dorsal ACC is involved in processing
uncertainty, while the ventral ACC is responsible for monitoring
emotions in self and others (Bush et al., 2000; Barch et al., 2001;
Critchley et al., 2003; Nomura et al., 2003; Amodio and Frith,
2006). Similar to the mPFC, the ACC is highly interconnected
with other brain areas and plays an integrative role in both social
and non-social cognitive processes (Allman et al., 2001).
In sum, these studies show that activation in brain areas
related to empathizing and mentalizing are modulated by the
degree to which interaction partners are perceived to have a mind,
with stronger activation for intentional agents (i.e., humans)
compared to non-intentional agents (i.e., robots; Leyens et al.,
2000; Gallagher et al., 2002; Sanfey et al., 2003; Harris and Fiske,
2006; Krach et al., 2008; Demoulin et al., 2009; Chaminade et al.,
2010; Spunt et al., 2015; Suzuki et al., 2015). Although further
studies are necessary to determine the constraints under which
robot agents activate the empathizing and mentalizing networks,
the aforementioned studies provide preliminary evidence that
activation in social brain areas involved in higher-order social-
cognitive processes like empathizing and mentalizing (i.e., mPFC,
TPJ, insula) more strongly depends on mind perception than
activation in social brain areas involved in lower-level social
cognitive processing like action understanding (i.e., APS). In
particular, it was shown that the APS can reach levels of activation
during human–robot interaction that are similar to human–
human interaction if certain constraints are met (i.e., human
appearance and motor kinematics), while a comparable effect has
not been reported for areas like the mPFC, TPJ or insula (i.e.,
areas get activated by robot agents but to a lesser degree than by
human agents). Interestingly, these neuroscientific findings are
in line with behavioral studies showing that humans seem to be
willing to treat robots as entities with agency (i.e., ability to plan
and act), but are reluctant to perceive them as entities that can
experience internal states (i.e., ability to sense and feel; Gray et al.,
2007). In consequence, research in social robotics would benefit
from identifying conditions under which artificial agents engage
mechanisms of higher-order social cognition in the human brain,
which may necessitate some effort to specifically design robots
as intentional and empathetic agents (Gonsior et al., 2012; Silva
et al., 2016).
EFFECTS OF MIND PERCEPTION ON
ATTITUDES AND PERFORMANCE IN HRI
Mind perception is not only essential for triggering activation in
social brain areas; it also has an impact on how we think and feel
about others, and how we perform actions with them (see Waytz
et al., 2010b; for a review). These effects on social interactions are
mainly positive: mind perception enhances the degree of social
connection felt towards others, leads to more prosocial behaviors,
motivates others to adhere to moral standards, and improves
performance on joint action tasks (see “Positive Effects of Mind
Perception in Social Interactions”). Under some circumstances,
however, mind perception can be disadvantageous in social
interactions, in particular, when the mind status of an agent is
ambiguous and evokes categorical uncertainty (i.e., ambiguity
regarding whether to classify the agent as human or robot), or
when an agent’s behavior deviates strongly enough from human
behavior so that an anthropomorphic model would lead to
incorrect predictions (see “Negative Effects of Mind Perception
in Social Interactions”).
Positive Effects of Mind Perception in
Social Interactions
Treating others as agents with a mind makes us feel socially
connected with them and fosters prosocial behaviors, such
as decreased cheating and increased generosity (Bering and
Johnson, 2005; Haley and Fessler, 2005; Gray et al., 2007, 2012;
Shariff and Norenzayan, 2007; Epley et al., 2008). The effect
of perceiving a mind in others on prosociality is so strong
that simply presenting a pair of eyes during task execution or
asking participants to perform a task in front of an audience
significantly decreases cheating behaviors and motivates people
to perpetuate moral standards (Haley and Fessler, 2005). The
positive effect of mind perception on prosocial behavior is even
stronger when the interaction partner is similar to the perceiver
or believed to belong to his ingroup (Shariff and Norenzayan,
2007; Graham and Haidt, 2010). Agents not being perceived
as having a mind, on the other hand, are perceived as being
incapable of experiencing emotional states, which makes them
unlikely recipients of empathy, morality or prosociality (Haslam,
2006; Hein et al., 2010; Cikara et al., 2011; Harris and Fiske,
2011; Gutsell and Inzlicht, 2012), and makes people feel less
guilty when performing harmful acts toward them (Castano and
Giner-Sorolla, 2006; Cehajic et al., 2009).
Mind perception also determines whether moral rights are
granted to others and how strongly they are judged when showing
immoral or harmful behaviors. According to Gray et al. (2007),
agents that have a high ability to experience internal and external
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FIGURE 3 | Effect of mind perception on the social relevance of observed behavior. (A) Participants are asked to perform a joint attention task (react as fast and
accurately as possible to the identity of a target letter: “F” vs. “T”) with the robot EDDIE (designed by Technical University of Munich). Results show that changes in
gaze direction are followed more strongly when the eye movements are believed to be intentional versus pre-programmed. (B) Grand average ERP waveforms
time-locked to the onset of the target for the pool of O1/O2/PO7/PO8 electrodes show that the belief that eye movements are intentional enhances sensory gain
control mechanisms, with larger P1 validity effects (i.e., difference between valid and invalid trials) for changes in gaze direction that are believed to be intentional (i.e.,
human-controlled, red lines) versus non-intentional (i.e., pre-programmed, green lines). (C) Topographical maps of voltage distribution (posterior view) show that
observing an intentional agent (left panel) versus a pre-programmed agent (right panel) modulates mechanisms of joint attention in occipital and parietal areas
(suggesting that attribution of mental states affects visual and early attentional processes). The time interval of the P1 component (100–140 ms) is presented in the
upper panel. The time interval of the N1 component (170–210 ms) is presented in the lower panel. For more details see: Wykowska et al. (2014b).
states, but a low ability to manipulate the environment (i.e.,
babies or puppies) are treated as ‘moral patients’ who deserve
protection, are granted moral rights, and are associated with
accidental rather than intentional negative behavior. Agents that
display a high degree of agency, but only a low degree of
experience (i.e., robots or corporations) are labeled as ‘moral
agents’ with full moral responsibilities and the ability to show
intentional behavior, in particular when it is harmful. Moral
patients are seen as subservient or animalistic, and are more likely
to be oppressed against their will or robbed of their human rights
(Fiske et al., 2002, 2007), while moral agents are perceived as cold
and robotic, and are more likely to be harmed by others (Fiske
et al., 2002, 2007; Loughnan and Haslam, 2007). In consequence,
this means that in order to be respected as a moral patient,
deserving of protection and moral rights, AND as a moral
agent, capable of showing intentional behavior, agents need to be
ascribed the ability to experience and act. However, while human
agents have this set of features by default, robots are typically
associated with a limited capability to sense themselves, others
and their environments (i.e., reduced ability to experience),
with the consequence that they are more likely to be denied
moral rights and judged more harshly for behaviors that lead to
negative consequences (Gray et al., 2007). This can potentially
be prevented by designing robots whose physical and behavioral
features trigger mind perception with a high likelihood (e.g., the
robot Leonardo; Breazeal et al., 2005).
Believing that an agent has a mind has also been shown to
increase the social relevance ascribed to its actions, which can
improve performance during social interactions: participants,
for instance, follow the eye movements of an agent more
strongly when they are believed to reflect intentional compared
to preprogrammed or random behavior (Wiese et al., 2012;
Wykowska et al., 2014b; Caruana et al., 2016; Özdem et al.,
2016; see Figure 3). Similarly, perceiving the actions of others
as intentional determines how intensely we experience their
outcomes (Barrett, 2004; Gilbert et al., 2004): an electric
shock hurts more when it is believed to be administered on
purpose rather than accidentally (Gray and Wegner, 2008), and
intentional harms are judged more rigorously than accidental
ones (Ohtsubo, 2007; Cushman, 2008). Perceiving human
features like ‘having a mind’ in non-human agents has also been
shown to induce social facilitation effects on human performance
(Bartneck, 2003; cf. Hoyt et al., 2003; Woods et al., 2005; Park and
Catrambone, 2007; Zanbaka et al., 2007; Riether et al., 2012; Hertz
and Wiese, 2017), and to foster learning via social reinforcement
(Druin and Hendler, 2000; Robins et al., 2005; see Figure 4).
The facilitatory effect of the presence of an intentional robot on
performance becomes even more prominent with an increasing
degree of physical embodiment of the robot (Bartneck, 2003;
Hoyt et al., 2003; Zanbaka et al., 2007).
Negative Effects of Mind Perception in
Social Interactions
Automatically perceiving mind or human-likeness in non-human
agents can also have negative consequences, in particular when
an agent is hard to categorize as human versus non-human
(Cheetham et al., 2011, 2014; Hackel et al., 2014), or when
the anthropomorphic model is not the best predictor for agent
behavior (Epley et al., 2007). With regard to categorization
difficulties, psychological research has shown that perceiving
humanness in others follows a categorical pattern, with agents
either being treated as ‘human’ or ‘non-human’ based on their
physical features, except at the category boundary located at
around 63% of physical humanness, where humanness ratings are
ambiguous (Looser and Wheatley, 2010; Cheetham et al., 2011,
2014; Hackel et al., 2014; Martini et al., 2016). The consequence
is that pairs of stimuli straddling the category boundary are
easier to discriminate (i.e., same or different stimuli?), but harder
to categorize (i.e., human or non-human?) than equally similar
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FIGURE 4 | Social facilitation effects in Human–Robot Interaction. Perceiving robot agents as having a mind can induce social facilitation effects on human
performance (i.e., presence of a robot agent facilitates performance on simple tasks, but worsens performance on difficult tasks) and foster learning via social
reinforcement (i.e., robot provides social cues like smiling for wanted behaviors). The facilitating and reinforcing abilities of companion robots can be used in the
classroom to improve learning (left image) or during driving to verbally and non-verbally encourage wanted driving behaviors (right image), for example. Written
informed consent has been obtained for publication of the identifiable image on the left. The image on the right was modified (the original image of the driving
simulator was retrieved from http://stevevolk.com; the original image of the robot was retrieved from: http://newsroom.toyota.co.jp/).
stimulus pairs located on the same side of the boundary (Repp,
1984; Harnad, 1987; Goldstone and Hendrickson, 2010; Looser
and Wheatley, 2010; Cheetham et al., 2011, 2014). Categorizing
agents located at the human–nonhuman category boundary
results in increased response times and decreased accuracy rates
(Cheetham et al., 2011, 2014), consistent with cognitive conflict
processing. Trying to resolve this cognitive conflict takes up
cognitive resources and can therefore have detrimental effects
on performance during tasks that are conjointly performed with
agents with an ambiguous mind status (Mandell et al., 2017; Weis
and Wiese, 2017).
The categorization conflict at the human–nonhuman
boundary has also been associated with the uncanny valley
phenomenon, where positive attitudes toward non-human
agents initially increase as the agents’ physical humanness
increases and then drop dramatically as the agents start to look
human-like but not perfectly human (i.e., uncanny valley), just
to recover and reach a maximum for agents that are fully human
(Mori, 1970; Kätsyri et al., 2015). In particular, it was argued
that negative affective reactions associated with uncanny stimuli
could be the result of conflict resolution processes triggered by
categorical ambiguity during categorization response selection
(Cheetham et al., 2011; Burleigh et al., 2013; Kätsyri et al.,
2015; see Figure 5). Alternatively, perceptions of uncanniness
could also be due to a mismatch of agent features, where one
feature, for instance physical appearance, suggests that the
agent might be human, but another feature, for instance lack of
biological motion, suggests otherwise (i.e., perceptual mismatch;
Seyama and Nagayama, 2007; MacDorman et al., 2009; Mitchell
et al., 2011; Saygin et al., 2012; Kätsyri et al., 2015). Both the
categorical ambiguity and the perceptual mismatch hypothesis
are based on the assumption that physical agent features drive
the automatic selection of a neural model that can be used to
predict agent behavior, and that categorical ambiguity of the
agent or perceptual mismatch of its features can lead to the
selection of an inaccurate neural model, which is associated with
error processing and might therefore trigger negative affective
reactions (Saygin et al., 2012)4.
For human–robot interaction, this means that designs should
be avoided that (a) trigger categorization difficulties due to
physical ambiguity, or (b) cause perceptual mismatch by
incorporating human- and machine-like features into the same
robot platform. The research also suggests that in order to predict
internal states and behaviors of non-human agents, humans need
to be able to flexibly activate, correct and apply anthropomorphic
knowledge to come up with the best possible prediction given
the current circumstances (Epley et al., 2007): when interacting
with unfamiliar or novel systems, it makes sense to activate
anthropomorphic knowledge and use it as a basis to predict
how the agent thinks, feels and behaves. However, as specific
agent knowledge becomes available with more experience, the
anthropomorphic model needs to be adjusted to match the
agent’s actual capabilities (Gilbert, 1991; Gilbert and Malone,
1995), even more so when precise predictions of behavior
are required or when future interactions with the agent are
anticipated (Epley et al., 2007). Robots that can trigger both an
anthropomorphic and a mechanistic mental model also have
the advantage that humans can switch between these models
depending on their current need for social contact and affiliation
or effective task performance. In consequence, this means that
robot design should not only focus on mind perception and
associated processes of mentalizing and empathizing, but should
also equip robots with triggers that activate machine mental
models in situations where the anthropomorphic model could
potentially lead to incorrect predictions. For example, if a robot
cannot grasp an object to pass it to the human user due to
hardware or software limitations, it would be useful for the user
to understand the underlying reasons so he/she does not blame
4Please note that conflicts might also lead to positive effects in human–robot
interaction given that they might lead human interaction partners to update their
internal representation of the robot to match better its abilities and features.
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FIGURE 5 | Mind perception can induce a cognitive conflict for agents with ambiguous physical appearance. (A) Effects of mind perception triggered by physical
appearance can be measured using a morphing procedure (e.g., image of a robot is morphed into image of a human or a dog in steps of 5%). (B) Mind perception
follows a qualitative (i.e., significant changes in mind ratings occur only after a critical level of physical humanness is reached) rather than a quantitative pattern (i.e.,
likelihood for perceiving mind increases in a linear fashion with physical humanness). The significant change in mind ratings occurs when the category boundary
between human and non-human is crossed (upper panel). Agents located at the category boundary are ambiguous in terms of their mind status, and trying to
categorize them as human versus non-human causes a cognitive conflict, which takes cognitive resources to resolve. The degree of cognitive conflict that is induced
by a categorical decision can be measured using mouse-tracking (i.e., the more curved the mouse movement, the larger the cognitive conflict; see Freeman and
Ambady, 2010). For more details regarding the experiment on cognitive conflict in HRI: Weis and Wiese (2017).
the robot for a lack of good intentions. This can be achieved,
for example, through the use of informative verbal messages (Lee
et al., 2010).
DESIGNING ROBOTS AS INTENTIONAL
AGENTS
In this section, we explore a number of studies privileging models
of the components of the social brain tested in real robots, in real-
time human–robot interaction. In doing so, we survey some of
the engineering work and technological limitations related to the
implementation of interactive robots.
In designing intentional agents, we need to consider the
appearance of a robot as well as its behavior (Tapus and
Matarić, 2006; Waytz et al., 2010b; Wykowska et al., 2016).
Robot appearance is concerned with the ‘bodyware’ or hardware
of the machine, while behavior concerns the observable results
of the workings of its ‘mindware’ or software. In advanced
robot designs, there is a tighter link between the body- and
mindware, since often what can be done and how depends
on the joint design of hardware and software. Engineering
approaches do not necessarily reflect solutions that have any
resemblance to their natural counterparts although there is a
tradition of robotic research that utilized neuroscience studies as
a starting point (Kawato, 1999; Scassellati, 2001; Demiris et al.,
2014). Although these approaches led to accurate models of
muscular-skeletal systems (Mizuuchi et al., 2006; Pfeifer et al.,
2012), facial features (Oh et al., 2006; Becker-Asano et al.,
2010), and human kinematics (Kaneko et al., 2009; Metta et al.,
2010), they are limited in their ability to reproduce movements
accurately in all possible contexts due to technological limitations
impacting the range and speed of motion (i.e., mechanics of
rigid bodies connected through rotary joints). Furthermore,
when talking about mindware, an important distinction needs
to be made between neurally accurate models – often proof
of principles – and actual working implementations on real
hardware, with profound differences between computers and
human brains impeding accurate real-time neural simulations
of large brain systems, such as those of the social brain. This,
however, does not necessarily influence focused experiments
targeting specific mechanisms of social-cognitive processing,
such as action understanding (via APS) or intention and emotion
understanding (via TPJ, mPFC and insula; Oztop et al., 2013).
To build robots that are perceived as intentional agents, we
need to ask whether it is even necessary that they accurately
emulate human behavior or whether it is sufficient for them
to just display certain aspects of human behavior that are
most strongly associated with the perception of intentionality
(Yamaoka et al., 2007). Given the technological limitations
associated with trying to reproduce large brain networks in
artificial agents, the goal needs to be the identification of a
minimal set of features that can reliably trigger mind perception
in non-human agents. Neuroscientists need to identify these
features and investigate their effects on attitudes and performance
in human–robot interactions, while engineers can help with
designing the robot body structure in such a way that faithfully
implements this minimal set of behavioral parameters in term
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of kinematics, dynamics, electronics, and computation. As a
corollary to this question, trying to build robots that are perceived
as intentional agents can also help to elucidate whether the
minimal set of parameters relates to a specific architecture
and how tuning various parameters affects the way a robot is
perceived.
From an engineering perspective, research in robotics and
artificial intelligence that may have an impact to intentionality
is vast (see Feil-Seifer and Matarić, 2009; for a review). First
attempts to build socially competent robots can be traced back
to the MIT robots Kismet (Breazeal, 2003) and Cog (Brooks
et al., 1999). With Kismet, Breazeal and Scassellati (1999) studied
how an expressive robot elicited appropriate social responses in
humans by displaying attention and turn-taking mechanisms.
They also identify some of the requirements of the visual
system of such robots (Breazeal et al., 2001) as for example
the advantages of foveated vision, eye contact (and therefore
detecting the eyes of the interactant in the visual scene), and
a number of sensorimotor control loops (e.g., avoid and seek
objects and people). Scassellati (2002) went further and took
some first steps toward implementing a theory of mind for
the robot Cog based on an established psychological model for
mentalizing developed by Baron-Cohen (1997). Among other
features, the model possesses a human-like attentional system
that identifies living agents and non-living objects from basic
perceptual features like optical flow. In particular, the model
relies on an Intentionality Detector (ID) that labels actions as
intentional based on their goal-directedness, as well as an Eye
Direction Detector (EDD) that allows the robot to shift its
attention to locations in space that are gazed-at by its human
interaction partner. Although the ID on Cog was relatively
simple, dealing exclusively with the issue of animacy versus
no animacy, it nevertheless had the advantage of being based
on a psychologically sound and empirically derived model of
mentalization.
Following the discovery of mirror neurons in non-human
primates and their involvement in action understanding (Gallese
et al., 1996), neuroscientifically inspired approaches to robotics
mainly focused on developing models for action recognition and
imitation (Metta et al., 2006; Oztop et al., 2013). The key concept
of shared sensorimotor representations, dating back to Liberman
and Mattingly (1985), guided a variety of implementations
utilizing, for example, recurrent neural networks (Tani et al.,
2004) or various other machine-learning methods that learn
direct-inverse models from examples (Oztop et al., 2006;
Demiris, 2007). Among these attempts to implement a mirror
neuron system into artificial agents, some models were more
neuroscientifically accurate than others (Arbib et al., 2000; see
Oztop et al., 2013; for a review). More recently, the use of RGBd
cameras boosted the ability to extract meaningful parameters
automatically from images allowing robots to engage in more
complex social interactions with their human counterparts. The
use of convolutional neural networks made a further step toward
robust body pose/skeleton extraction from images (even 2D; see
Cao et al., 2016), which is a fundamental component for robots
to interact in a complex way within a social context.
More recently, Pointeau et al. (2013) utilized both object
recognition and human posture detection to give a humanoid
robot the ability to implement spatial perspective taking during
the execution of a shared task in human–robot interaction.
Spatial reasoning was implemented via simulation of the
environment in 3D, which allowed for disambiguating linguistic
constructs (e.g., ‘object on the left’). An autobiographical memory
was utilized to learn the structure of the shared task, which was
represented as a sequence of elemental steps allowing the robot
to take the human’s perspective and to step in at any given point
of the task execution. Although this architecture bears some
resemblance with certain brain functions, such as memorizing
sequences and spatial perspective taking, its implementation still
relies exclusively on engineering methods, utilizing simple tables
and strictly symbolic representations, instead of neurologically
plausible mechanisms.
Other areas of research relevant to the design of robots
as intentional agents include image and object recognition, as
well as spatial reasoning. In terms of object recognition, brain-
inspired models have dominated the field for several years (Serre
et al., 2005), but are being replaced by the modern “brute force”
approach of using very large neural networks and managing
the increased computational cost through specialized processors
(e.g., GPUs), resulting in an improvement in performance of
orders of magnitude (Krizhevsky et al., 2012). In terms of
spatial navigation, roboticists have developed a set of standard
methods including probabilistic localization techniques and
planning impact-free movements (O’Donnell and Lozano-Pérez,
1989; Thrun, 2002), some of which are also building blocks
for robot controllers that help avoid contact and/or reach
properly during human–robot interaction (Kulić and Croft, 2005;
De Santis et al., 2008). Other active research directions within
the theme of spatial reasoning explore how to represent spatial
data (i.e., objects and people in 3D, their spatial relationships),
and how to connect linguistic constructs that imply spatial
relationships with reasoning (Sugiyama et al., 2006; Gold et al.,
2009; Hato et al., 2010). Spatial knowledge is one element of the
correct interpretation of deictic gestures, which by their nature
require both the gesture itself and general knowledge about the
environment, which usually, in human–human interaction, co-
occur with utterances. Therefore, for the robot to understand
them, location and recognition of the hand configuration,
the spatial configuration of objects/people in the world, and
speech recognition have to be integrated (Brooks and Breazeal,
2006).
In summary, this short overview indicates that some of the
problems in designing intentional robots require competencies
that span the whole range of human cognitive skills in both
perceptual and reasoning terms, and that psychologically and
neuroscientifically sound implementations thereof are for the
most part missing. Furthermore, while important aspects of
human–robot interaction are currently addressed in isolated
models, a more integrated architecture that combines cognitive
and social functioning does not exist and the effectiveness
of the existing models on mind perception and attitudes
and performance in human–robot interaction has not been
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sufficiently investigated. In the future, neuroscientists and
roboticists need to work together to identify at least a minimal set
of physical and behavioral robot features that have the potential to
activate the same areas in the human brain as human interaction
partners. In doing so, it is still not guaranteed that the exact
functioning of the human neural system can be emulated in
artificial agents, but it at least increases the likelihood that robot
agents are treated as if they were intentional agents.
CONCLUSION
We highlight that the design of social robots should be based on
methods of cognitive neuroscience in order to determine robot
features (e.g., behavioral features, such as timing of saccades,
head-eye coordination, frequency and length of gaze toward a
human user) that activate mechanisms of social cognition in the
human brain. Neuroscientific results inform us about what these
mechanisms are, how they are implemented in human neural
architecture and when they are activated. These results can also
inspire research in artificial intelligence and robotics so that
robot architectures can be based on similar principles as those
operating in the human brain (even if this is at present often
a challenging enterprise due to technological limitations), and
allow for more human-like behaviors of robots. As one of the key
factors activating mechanisms of social cognition is attribution
of intentionality to robots, it is important to understand the
conditions under which humans perceive robots as intentional
agents, and what consequences attribution of intentionality
may have for human–robot interaction. Although adopting an
anthropomorphic mental model in explaining the behaviors of
robot agents usually has positive consequences on attitudes and
performance in human–robot interaction, in some cases it might
hinder the quality of human–robot interaction, in particular
when some agent features trigger mind perception and others
do not. Therefore, it is extremely important to design robots
based on systematic studies, perhaps with an iterative approach,
in order to understand which parameters of the robot’s behavior
and appearance activate the social brain and elicit attribution of
intentionality, and whether in certain cases it is better not to
evoke mind attribution.
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Kulić, D., and Croft, E. A. (2005). Safe planning for human-robot interaction.
J. Field Robot. 22, 383–396. doi: 10.1002/rob.20073
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 16 October 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 1663
fpsyg-08-01663 September 29, 2017 Time: 15:55 # 17
Wiese et al. Robots As Intentional Agents
Kupferberg, A., Huber, M., Helfer, B., Lenz, C., Knoll, A., and Glasauer, S. (2012).
Moving just like you: motor interference depends on similar motility of agent
and observer. PLOS ONE 7:e39637. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0039637
Lee, M. K., Kiesler, S., Forlizzi, J., Srinivasa, S., and Rybski, P. (2010). “Gracefully
mitigating breakdowns in robotic services,” in Proceedings of the ACM/IEEE
International Conference on Human-Robot Interaction (HRI), Pittsburgh, PA,
203–210.
Leslie, A. M., Friedman, O., and German, T. P. (2004). Core mechanisms in theory
of mind. Trends Cogn. Sci. 8, 528–533. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2004.10.001
Leyens, J. P., Paladino, P. M., Rodriguez-Torres, R., Vaes, J., Demoulin, S.,
Rodriguez-Perez, A., et al. (2000). The emotional side of prejudice: the
attribution of secondary emotions to ingroups and outgroups. Pers. Soc. Psychol.
Rev. 4, 186–197. doi: 10.1207/S15327957PSPR0402_06
Liberman, A. M., and Mattingly, I. G. (1985). The motor theory of speech
perception revised. Cognition 21, 1–36. doi: 10.1016/0010-0277(85)90021-6
Looser, C. E., Guntupalli, J. S., and Wheatley, T. (2013). Multivoxel patterns in face-
sensitive temporal regions reveal an encoding schema based on detecting life in
a face. Soc. Cogn. Affect. Neurosci. 8, 799–805. doi: 10.1093/scan/nss078
Looser, C. E., and Wheatley, T. (2010). The tipping point of animacy: how, when,
and where we perceive life in a face. Psychol. Sci. 21, 1854–1862. doi: 10.1177/
0956797610388044
Loughnan, S., and Haslam, N. (2007). Animals and androids: implicit associations
between social categories and nonhumans. Psychol. Sci. 18, 116–121. doi: 10.
1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01858.x
MacDorman, K. F., Green, R. D., Ho, C.-C., and Koch, C. T. (2009). Too real
for comfort? Uncanny responses to computer generated faces. Comput. Hum.
Behav. 25, 695–710. doi: 10.1016/j.chb.2008.12.026
Mandell, A., Smith, M., and Wiese, E. (2017). “Mind perception in humanoid
agents has negative effects on cognitive processing,” in Proceedings of Human
Factors and Ergonomics Society, Austin, TX.
Martin, R. F., Carlos, A. D., Jose Maria, C. P., Gonzalo, A. D., Raul, B. M., Rivero, S.,
et al. (2013). Robots in therapy for dementia patients. J. Phys. Agents 7, 49–56.
Martini, M. C., Gonzalez, C. A., and Wiese, E. (2016). Seeing minds in others–
Can agents with robotic appearance have human-like preferences? PLOS ONE
11:e0146310. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0146310
Maurer, D., Le Grand, R., and Mondloch, C. J. (2002). The many faces of configural
processing. Trends Cogn. Sci. 6, 255–260. doi: 10.1016/S1364-6613(02)01903-4
McCabe, K., Houser, D., Ryan, L., Smith, V., and Trouard, T. A. (2001).
A functional imaging study of cooperation in two person reciprocal exchange.
Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 98, 11832–11835. doi: 10.1073/pnas.211415698
Metta, G., Natale, L., Nori, F., Sandini, G., Vernon, D., Fadiga, L., et al. (2010).
The iCub humanoid robot: an open-systems platform for research in cognitive
development. Neural Netw. 23, 1125–1134. doi: 10.1016/j.neunet.2010.08.010
Metta, G., Sandini, G., Natale, L., Craighero, L., and Fadiga, L. (2006).
Understanding mirror neurons: a bio-robotic approach. Interact. Stud. 7,
197–232. doi: 10.1075/is.7.2.06met
Metta, G., Sandini, G., Vernon, D., Natale, L., and Nori, F. (2008). “The iCub
humanoid robot: an open platform for research in embodied cognition,” in
Proceedings of the 8th Workshop on Performance Metrics for Intelligent Systems,
Gaithersburg, MD.
Mitchell, J. P. (2008). Activity in right temporo-parietal junction is not selective for
theory-of-mind. Cereb. Cortex 18, 262–271. doi: 10.1093/cercor/bhm051
Mitchell, J. P., Macrae, C. N., and Banaji, M. R. (2006). Dissociable medial
prefrontal contributions to judgments of similar and dissimilar others. Neuron
50, 655–663. doi: 10.1016/j.neuron.2006.03.040
Mitchell, W. J., Szerszen, K. A., Lu, A. S., Schermerhorn, P. W., Scheutz, M., and
MacDorman, K. F. (2011). A mismatch in the human realism of face and voice
produces an uncanny valley. Iperception 2, 10–12. doi: 10.1068/i0415
Mizuuchi, I., Yoshikai, T., Sodeyama, Y., Nakanishi, Y., Miyadera, A.,
Yamamoto, T., et al. (2006). “Development of musculoskeletal humanoid
kotaro,” in Proceedings of The 2006 IEEE International Conference on Robotics
and Automation, Orlando, FL.
Moore, C., and Dunham, P. (1995). Joint Attention: Its Origins and Role in
Development. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Mori, M. (1970). Bukimi no tani [the uncanny valley]. Energy 7, 33–35.
Mubin, O., Stevens, C. J., Shadid, S., Al Mahmud, A., and Dong, J. J. (2013).
A review of the applicability of robots in education. Technol. Educ. Learn. 1,
1–7. doi: 10.2316/Journal.209.2013.1.209-0015
Mukamel, R., Ekstrom, A., Kaplan, J., Iacoboni, M., and Fried, I. (2010). Single
neuron responses in humans during execution and observation of actions. Curr.
Biol. 20, 750–756. doi: 10.1016/j.cub.2010.02.045
Nagel, T. (1974). What is it like to be a bat? Philos. Rev. 83, 435–450. doi: 10.1017/
CBO9781107341050.014
Neven, L. (2010). ‘But obviously not for me’: robots, laboratories and the defiant
identity of elder test users. Sociol. Health Illn. 32, 335–347. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-
9566.2009.01218.x
Nomura, M., Iidaka, T., Kakehi, K., Tsukiura, T., Hasegawa, T., Maeda, Y., et al.
(2003). Frontal lobe networks for effective processing of ambiguously expressed
emotions in humans. Neurosci. Lett. 348, 113–116. doi: 10.1016/S0304-3940(03)
00768-7
Oberman, L. M., McCleery, J. P., Ramachandran, V. S., and Pineda, J. A. (2007).
EEG evidence for mirror neuron activity during the observation of human and
robot actions: toward an analysis of the human qualities of interactive robots.
Neurocomputing 70, 2194–2203. doi: 10.1016/j.neucom.2006.02.024
O’Donnell, P. A., and Lozano-Pérez, T. (1989). “Deadlock-free and collision-free
coordination of two robot manipulators,” in IEEE International Conference on
Robotics and Automation, Vol. 89, Cambridge, MA, 484–489. doi: 10.1109/
ROBOT.1989.100033
Oh, J. H., Hanson, D., Kim, W. S., Han, Y., Kim, J. Y., and Park, I. W. (2006).
“Design of android type humanoid robot Albert HUBO,” in Proceedings of the
IEEE/RSJ International Conference on Intelligent Robots and Systems, Secaucus,
NJ, 1428–1433. doi: 10.1109/IROS.2006.281935
Ohnishi, T., Moriguchi, Y., Matsuda, H., Mori, T., Hirakata, M., Imabayashi, E.,
et al. (2004). The neural network for the mirror system and mentalizing
in normally developed children: an fMRI study. Neuroreport 15, 1483–1487.
doi: 10.1097/01.wnr.0000127464.17770.1f
Ohtsubo, Y. (2007). Perceiver intentionality intensifies blameworthiness of
negative behaviors: blame-praise asymmetry in intensification effect. J. Psychol.
Res. 49, 100–110. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-5884.2007.00337.x
Özdem, C., Wiese, E., Wykowska, A., Müller, H., Brass, M., and Van Overwalle,
F. (2016). Believing androids–fMRI activation in the right temporo-parietal
junction is modulated by ascribing intentions to non-human agents. Soc.
Neurosci. 12, 582–593. doi: 10.1080/17470919.2016.1207702
Oztop, E., Franklin, D., Chaminade, T., and Gordon, C. (2005). Human-humanoid
interaction: is a humanoid robot perceived as a human. Int. J. HR 2, 537–559.
doi: 10.1142/S0219843605000582
Oztop, E., Kawato, M., and Arbib, M. (2006). Mirror neurons and imitation:
a computationally guided review. Neural Netw. 19, 254–271. doi: 10.1016/j.
neunet.2006.02.002
Oztop, E., Kawato, M., and Arbib, M. A. (2013). Mirror neurons: functions,
mechanisms and models. Neurosci. Lett. 540, 43–55. doi: 10.1016/j.neulet.2012.
10.005
Park, S., and Catrambone, R. (2007). Social facilitation effects of virtual humans.
Hum. Factors 49, 1054–1060. doi: 10.1518/001872007X249910
Perner, J., Aichhorn, M., Kronbichler, M., Staffen, W., and Ladurner, G.
(2006). Thinking of mental and other representations: the roles of left and
right temporo-parietal junction. Soc. Neurosci. 1, 245–258. doi: 10.1080/
17470910600989896
Pfeifer, R., Lungarella, M., and Iida, F. (2012). The challenges ahead for bio-inspired
’soft’ robotics. Commun. ACM 55, 76–87. doi: 10.1145/2366316.2366335
Pobric, G., and Hamilton, A. (2006). Action understanding requires the left inferior
frontal cortex. Curr. Biol. 16, 524–529. doi: 10.1016/j.cub.2006.01.033
Pointeau, G., Petit, M., and Ford Dominey, P. (2013). “Embodied simulation based
on autobiographical memory,” in Living Machines, eds N. F. Lepora, A. Mura,
H. G. Krapp, P. F. M. J. Verschure, and T. J. Prescott (Berlin: Springer-Verlag),
240–250. doi: 10.1007/978-3-642-39802-5-21
Prange, G. B., Jannink, M. J. A., Groothuis-Oudshoorn, C. G. M., Hermens, H. J.,
and IJzerman, M. J. (2006). Systematic review of the effect of robot-aided
therapy on recovery of the hemiparetic arm after stroke. J. Rehabil. Res. Dev.
43, 171–184. doi: 10.1682/JRRD.2005.04.0076
Press, C., Bird, G., Flach, R., and Heyes, C. (2005). Robotic movement elicits
automatic imitation. Cogn. Brain Res. 25, 632–640. doi: 10.1016/j.cogbrainres.
2005.08.020
Press, C., Gillmeister, H., and Heyes, C. (2006). Bottom-up, not top-down,
modulation of imitation by human and robotic models. Eur. J. Neurosci.
24:2415–2419. doi: 10.1111/j.1460-9568.2006.05115.x
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 17 October 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 1663
fpsyg-08-01663 September 29, 2017 Time: 15:55 # 18
Wiese et al. Robots As Intentional Agents
Press, C., Gillmeister, H., and Heyes, C. (2007). Sensorimotor experience enhances
automatic imitation of robotic action. Proc. R. Soc. B 274, 2509–2514.
doi: 10.1098/rspb.2007.0774
Preston, S. D., and de Waal, F. B. M. (2002). Empathy: its ultimate and proximate
bases. Behav. Brain Sci. 25, 1–72. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X02000018
Repp, B. H. (1984). “Categorical perception: issues, methods, findings,” in Speech
and Language: Advances in Basic Research and Practice, Vol. 10, ed. J. Lass
(New York, NY: Academic Press), 243–335. doi: 10.1016/B978-0-12-608610-
2.50012-1
Ricks, D. J., and Colton, M. B. (2010). “Trends and considerations in robot assisted
autism therapy,” in Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Robotics
and Automation (ICRA), Anchorage, AK, 4354–4359. doi: 10.1109/ROBOT.
2010.5509327
Riedl, R., Mohr, P., Kenning, P., Davis, F. D., and Heekeren, H. (2014). Trusting
humans and avatars: a brain imaging study based on evolution theory.
J. Manage. Inf. Syst. 30, 83–113. doi: 10.2753/MIS0742-1222300404
Riether, N., Hegel, F., Wrede, B., and Horstmann, G. (2012). “Social facilitation
with social robots?,” in Proceedings of the Seventh Annual ACM/IEEE
International Conference on Human-Robot Interaction, Boston, MA, 41–47.
doi: 10.1145/2157689.2157697
Rizzolatti, G., and Craighero, L. (2004). The mirror-neuron system. Annu. Rev.
Neurosci. 27, 169–192. doi: 10.1146/annurev.neuro.27.070203.144230
Robins, B., Dautenhahn, K., Te Boekhorst, R., and Billard, A. (2005). Robotic
assistants in therapy and education of children with autism: can a small
humanoid robot help encourage social interaction skills? Univers. Access Inf.
Soc. 4, 105–120. doi: 10.1007/s10209-005-0116-3
Rosset, E. (2008). It’s no accident: our bias for intentional explanations. Cognition
108, 771–780. doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2008.07.001
Ruby, P., and Decety, J. (2001). Effect of subjective perspective taking during
simulation of action: a PET investigation of agency. Nat. Neurosci. 4, 546–550.
Samson, D., Apperly, I. A., Braithwaite, J. J., Andrews, B. J., and Bodley Scott, S. E.
(2010). Seeing it their way: Evidence for rapid and involuntary computation of
what other people see. J. Exp. Psychol. 36, 1255–1266. doi: 10.1037/a0018729
Samson, D., Apperly, I. A., Chiavarino, C., and Humphreys, G. W. (2004). Left
temporo-parietal junction is necessary for representing someone else’s belief.
Nat. Neurosci. 7, 499–500. doi: 10.1038/nn1223
Sanfey, A. G., Rilling, J. K., Aronson, J. A., Nystrom, L. E., and Cohen, J. D. (2003).
The neural basis of economic decision-making in the ultimatum game. Science
300, 1755–1758. doi: 10.1126/science.1082976
Saxe, R., and Kanwisher, N. (2003). People thinking about thinking people: the
role of the temporo-parietal junction in “theory of mind.”. Neuroimage 19,
1835–1842. doi: 10.1016/S1053-8119(03)00230-1
Saxe, R., and Powell, L. J. (2006). It’s the thought that counts: specific brain regions
for one component of theory of mind. Psychol. Sci. 17, 692–699. doi: 10.1111/j.
1467-9280.2006.01768.x
Saxe, R., and Wexler, A. (2005). Making sense of another mind: the role of the
right temporo-parietal junction. Neuropsychologia 43, 1391–1399. doi: 10.1016/
j.neuropsychologia.2005.02.013
Saygin, A. P. (2007). Superior temporal and premotor brain areas necessary
for biological motion perception. Brain 130, 2452–2461. doi: 10.1093/brain/
awm162
Saygin, A. P., Chaminade, T., Ishiguro, H., Driver, J., and Frith, C. (2012). The
thing that should not be: predictive coding and the uncanny valley in perceiving
human and humanoid robot actions. Soc. Cogn. Affect. Neurosci. 7, 413–422.
doi: 10.1093/scan/nsr025
Saygin, A. P., Wilson, S. M., Hagler, D. J. Jr., Bates, E., and Sereno, M. I. (2004).
Point-light biological motion perception activates human premotor cortex.
J. Neurosci. 24, 6181–6188. doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.0504-04.2004
Scassellati, B. (2001). Foundations for a Theory of Mind for a Humanoid Robot,
Ph.D. thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA.
Scassellati, B. (2002). Theory of mind for a humanoid robot. Auton. Robots 12,
13–24. doi: 10.1037/e445252005-001
Scassellati, B., Admoni, H., and Matarić, M. (2012). Robots for use in autism
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